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Author SHA1 Message Date
neil 807da64983 Merge pull request #7275 from acmesh-official/dev
allowed_signers: point the examples at 3.1.6
2026-09-20 13:14:12 +02:00
neil aafc4efe1f allowed_signers: point the examples at 3.1.6
The comment block told the reader to run "git verify-tag 3.1.5", which is
exactly the tag that fails: 3.1.5 was tagged by the GitHub release form as
a lightweight ref and carries no signature. Use 3.1.6 in the examples and
state the baseline, so the file that teaches verification does not hand out
a command that cannot work.

https://github.com/acmesh-official/acme.sh/issues/7273
2026-09-20 13:13:20 +02:00
neil c37315c194 Merge pull request #7274 from acmesh-official/dev
Move the release signing baseline to 3.1.6 and catch lightweight tags…
2026-09-20 13:08:05 +02:00
neil 138e0dff84 Move the release signing baseline to 3.1.6 and catch lightweight tags in CI
The 3.1.5 tag was created server-side by publishing the GitHub release,
which can only produce a lightweight ref, so it carries no signature and
git verify-tag fails on it. Rather than force-move a published tag, state
that signing starts at 3.1.6 and cut that tag locally with git tag -s
before the release is published.

vtag.yml now fails the run when the pushed tag is not a tag object, so the
same mistake shows up as a red check on the release instead of arriving as
a user report. The mirror step runs first, so v<tag> is still created; its
early "already exists" return became an else branch so the check is never
skipped.

https://github.com/acmesh-official/acme.sh/issues/7273
2026-09-20 13:06:37 +02:00
4 changed files with 39 additions and 14 deletions

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+30 -7
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@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ name: Mirror version tag
# pointing to the same object, so both forms exist.
# No retrigger loop: the tag filter never matches a "v"-prefixed tag, and
# refs created with GITHUB_TOKEN do not fire workflows anyway.
# The job mirrors first and then fails when the pushed tag is lightweight,
# which is what the release form produces: that tag can never carry a
# signature, so the failure has to be loud.
on:
push:
@@ -26,19 +29,39 @@ jobs:
REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
TAG: ${{ github.ref_name }}
run: |
if gh api "repos/$REPO/git/ref/tags/v$TAG" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "Tag v$TAG already exists, nothing to do."
exit 0
fi
# Mirror the object the pushed tag actually points at: the commit
# for a lightweight tag, the tag object itself for an annotated or
# signed one. Pointing the mirror at the commit would strip the
# signature, so "git verify-tag v3.1.3" would fail while
# "git verify-tag 3.1.3" succeeds.
sha="$(gh api "repos/$REPO/git/ref/tags/$TAG" --jq .object.sha)"
_ref="$(gh api "repos/$REPO/git/ref/tags/$TAG" --jq '.object.sha + " " + .object.type')"
sha="${_ref%% *}"
objtype="${_ref##* }"
if [ -z "$sha" ] || [ "$sha" = "null" ]; then
echo "Could not resolve refs/tags/$TAG"
exit 1
fi
gh api "repos/$REPO/git/refs" -f ref="refs/tags/v$TAG" -f sha="$sha"
echo "Created tag v$TAG -> $sha"
if gh api "repos/$REPO/git/ref/tags/v$TAG" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "Tag v$TAG already exists, nothing to do."
else
gh api "repos/$REPO/git/refs" -f ref="refs/tags/v$TAG" -f sha="$sha"
echo "Created tag v$TAG -> $sha"
fi
- name: Check that the tag is signable
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
TAG: ${{ github.ref_name }}
run: |
# A release published from the GitHub UI creates the tag server-side
# as a lightweight ref, which points straight at a commit and can
# never carry a signature (3.1.5 shipped that way, see issue 7273).
# The tag has to be created locally with "git tag -s" and pushed
# BEFORE the release is published, then selected on the release form.
objtype="$(gh api "repos/$REPO/git/ref/tags/$TAG" --jq .object.type)"
if [ "$objtype" != "tag" ]; then
echo "::error::refs/tags/$TAG points at a $objtype, not a tag object. It is a lightweight tag and carries no signature. Recreate it locally with 'git tag -s $TAG' and push it before publishing the release."
exit 1
fi
echo "refs/tags/$TAG is a tag object."
+4 -4
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@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ acme.sh -h
#### 🔏 Verify a Release
Release tags from `3.1.5` on are signed with the maintainer's SSH key. The
Release tags from `3.1.6` on are signed with the maintainer's SSH key. The
signing happens on the maintainer's machine, so the private key is never
available to CI. The public half is [`allowed_signers`](allowed_signers) in
this repository. From a clone:
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ git config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile allowed_signers
```
```bash
git verify-tag 3.1.5
git verify-tag 3.1.6
```
The signature covers the tag object, which pins the commit and therefore the
@@ -251,10 +251,10 @@ whole tree, so a good signature verifies every file at that release and no
separate tarball checksum is needed. Build a tarball from the verified tag:
```bash
git archive --format=tar.gz --prefix=acme.sh-3.1.5/ 3.1.5 > acme.sh-3.1.5.tar.gz
git archive --format=tar.gz --prefix=acme.sh-3.1.6/ 3.1.6 > acme.sh-3.1.6.tar.gz
```
> ⚠️ Tags up to `3.1.4` predate the signing key and are unsigned.
> ⚠️ Tags up to `3.1.5` are unsigned.
---
+1 -1
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#!/usr/bin/env sh
VER=3.1.5
VER=3.1.6
PROJECT_NAME="acme.sh"
+4 -2
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@@ -4,17 +4,19 @@
# maintainer and is never available to CI, so a compromise of the build
# pipeline cannot produce a tag that verifies against this file.
#
# Signing starts at 3.1.6; tags up to 3.1.5 are unsigned.
#
# Fingerprint: SHA256:M60qVafm/NUywQHXAkoQcj2v6KgkfrdSXv6mPejUUeE
#
# To verify a release tag, from a clone of this repository:
#
# git config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile allowed_signers
# git verify-tag 3.1.5
# git verify-tag 3.1.6
#
# A good signature covers the tag object, which pins the commit, which pins
# the whole tree -- so verifying the tag verifies every file at that
# release. Build a tarball from the verified tag with:
#
# git archive --format=tar.gz --prefix=acme.sh-3.1.5/ 3.1.5 > acme.sh-3.1.5.tar.gz
# git archive --format=tar.gz --prefix=acme.sh-3.1.6/ 3.1.6 > acme.sh-3.1.6.tar.gz
#
github@neilpang.com namespaces="git" ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIBTjI0HBJn3uhfT2DsNcFybfAZi3ADbIacMpz1BItKdB
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